DEVELOPING NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

IN THE "GORBACHEV ERA"

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DEVELOPING NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY IN THE "GORBACHEV ERA"

Introduction

Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev is a glittering personality who has boldly seized the international political initiative. "Glasnost" and "perestroika" have become almost household words which connote a changed, fresh Soviet outlook on the world. The impact on United States national security policy is extraordinarily significant because the dramatic nature of recent Soviet arms control/arms reduction proposals has a particularly poignant political appeal in Western Europe. Gorbachev has succeeded in parlaying Soviet military power into a political initiative which confronts the United States with unprecedented opportunities and challenges: we face the enticing prospect of a reduction in East-West military tensions balanced against the much less appealing possibility that Gorbachev may be succeeding in politically eroding the cohesion of the NATO alliance after failing to do so militarily. To cope successfully, the U.S. will have to maintain military strength while more fully developing the diplomatic and economic tools of statecraft.

Implications of the "Change vs. Continuity" Argument

A great deal of academic attention has focused on whether "change" in the Soviet Union, evoked by supposed "new

thinking," is "real" or not, and what the implications of such change might be. Conservative analysts of past Soviet institutional behavior argue that the idea of change in Soviet rhetoric hardly justifies assuming that Soviet intentions have changed. They cite four main factors which mitigate against fundamental change in the Soviet Union's foreign objectives:

- the permanence of Soviet national interests which derive from the most basic national security needs, such as warm water ports and territorial buffer zones;

- historical experience, which justifies Soviet fears of foreign invasion and rationalizes that Soviet expansionism in Eurasia is a natural and continuing course;

- stability in the Soviet political system and a political process which, although apparently attempting to incorporate some democratic principles, is essentially unchanged either at the level of the ruling elite or at lower levels of the bureaucracy;

- Marxist-Leninist ideology, which legitimizes the political process and provides both a sense of purpose and a framework for achieving the goals of Socialism, which Gorbachev has reaffirmed.[1]

Proponents of the idea that fundamental change is occurring in the Soviet Union's approach to international relations cite numerous items to support their contention. In addition to the obvious change in tone and rhetoric, they list concrete examples such as:

- agreement on the INF treaty;

- the announced unilateral troop reductions in Eastern Europe, coupled with redeployment of certain items, such as bridging equipment, so as to appear less offensively oriented;

- completion of the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan in accordance with its publicly announced timetable;

- apparent reconsideration of military doctrine (leading to the principle of "reasonable sufficiency") and relegation of the military to a position of somewhat lower prominence in the foreign policy establishment.

Although arbitrating this debate is outside the scope of this paper, the nature of the discussion cuts to the very core of the issue at hand. Those who see fundamental change occurring tend to focus on the manifestations of that change, while those who perceive continuity tend to focus on historical imperatives and the psychological aspects of national behavior. Finding a way to reconcile these disparate positions involves developing the ability to operate in a multipolar world which could include either a peaceful, responsible Soviet Union integrated into international society or a stronger, more aggressive Soviet Union which will continue to pursue policies inimical to Western interests.

The United States must be able to deal cogently with not only the short-term effects of Gorbachev's proposals, but also with their longer-term implications and consequences. National security policy, and the strategies which support it, must

afford the United States (and its allies) with the opportunity to build on the best case while still being able to defend against the worst case. The challenge is particularly acute in Western Europe, where the national interests of our NATO allies no longer appear to them to be as direly threatened as they were during the height of the Cold War.

The Central Question

The purpose of this paper is to consider the following central question: can the United States develop a sensible, credible national security policy with respect to Western Europe in the face of the Gorbachev initiatives? The issue requires an understanding of the relationship between strategy and policy at both the national and theater levels, as well as an appreciation of the dynamics of interactions between superpowers and their constituencies. The answer is important because Gorbachev's initiatives have challenged over 40 years of military, political, economic, and ideological concepts which have been central to both United States and Soviet national security strategies and policies. We are faced with a situation where we must deal with the manifestations of Gorbachev's rhetoric and the pacifist idealism it engenders in the West, yet still maintain our military capability until the threat posed by Soviet military capabilities is actually diminished. We must deal with reality while guarding against wishful thinking. The problems this engenders can be best

understood by reviewing the evolution of U.S. national security policy and strategy, beginning with precise definition of the terms and their relationship to one another.

Strategy and Policy

Failure to clearly define the terminology used in discussion of national security affairs suggests a lack of intellectual discipline and the consequent inability to think clearly about the roles which various instruments of national power must play in the formulation of policy and the development of strategy. It also can affect diplomacy, where precise terminology is needed to accurately convey ideas and concepts which are translated for foreign audiences--publicly and privately for both adversary and ally. Strategy and policy are different at both the theoretical and operative levels (the operative level being where actual objectives are formulated and pursued), but it is the hierarchy between them which is most important yet most difficult to understand; in fact, the terms are used flagrantly as synonyms because of their many areas of overlap and interdependence. As Eccles points out:

> They [policy and strategy] blend and overlap. Both provide guidance for plans and operations. Both arise out of the desire to achieve an effect related to or in support of an interest. In most instances each term should be so modified that its meaning is clear.[2]

A strategy is a plan that links ends and means; it involves rationalizing relationships between interests, values, threats,

and resources. It is dominated by objectives which emerge from this rationalization process. It involves setting priorities--ends must be weighed against the means available for achieving them. Grand, or national strategy, is dominated by objectives emanating from enduring values which define, in broad terms, the very essence of a nation; it is the nation's plan for using its instruments of power to achieve objectives which are in the national interest. Logically, grand strategy sits atop a pyramid of subordinate strategies, such as national security strategy and its servants, which include military strategy.

A policy defines the rationale for the various courses of action which strategy considers. It includes, in broad terms, guidelines for the conduct of operations (military, economic, diplomatic, or whatever). Formulating policy involves defining the relative emphasis to be accorded the various instruments of statecraft, but it must be supported by strategy. To quote Eccles again:

> Policy, whether national, strategic, administrative or what have you, provides guidance under which officials work to obtain an effect desired. Policy by itself achieves nothing until it is carried out by specific plans and specific action.[3]

On one level, policy must direct the goals of strategy; on another level, it must reflect the goals of strategy at a higher echelon. There is thus a certain fuzzy hierarchy, as Liddell Hart explained:

> While practically synonymous with the policy which guides the conduct of war, as distinct from the more fundamental policy which governs

> its object, the term 'grand strategy' serves to bring out the sense of 'policy in execution'.[4]

What this means in theory is that grand strategy executes fundamental policy; national security policy in turn devolves from grand strategy and governs national security strategy; defense policy reflects the national security strategy and governs military strategy. In both theory and practice subordinate policies and strategies interactively support the higher policies and strategies. In practice policy must deal with the real world, fact-of-life conditions achieved because of the effects of strategy--or, more likely, by the effects of the interaction of two or more opposing or competing strategies. On the other hand, strategy in practice epitomizes the means and ends calculus. It consists of making concrete decisions about allocating resources to meet commitments. In national security affairs, requests for resources must be justified by threats. In the endless competition for scarce resources, the budget process tends to dominate and constrain both national security policy and strategy by forcing leaders to prioritize threats and resources rather than interests.

The Danger Today

Two dangers emerge from this situation. The first danger that the United States faces today, as it has since the late 1940s, is that preoccupation with acquiring the means to support a subordinate strategy, e.g. overemphasis on

acquisition of the military means for executing national security strategy, allows pursuit of the means to be substituted for pursuit of the more meaningful ends. The second and more important danger, however, is that decades of preoccupation with enhancing the military means has limited, if not precluded, coherent integration of other instruments of power with the military instrument--an ever increasing threat has justified ever increasing means, and national security policy has, perversely but quite naturally, been dominated by the military strategies for dealing with an essentially unidimensional Soviet threat.

Now, confronted with a Soviet leader who recognizes that damage done by the Soviet Union's pursuit of military power at the expense of other elements of national security has created an imperative for restructuring, the United States may face the same problem. Today's policy options may in fact be constrained because past policy has neglected the potential of economic and political instruments. At least in part because of its unwillingness to prioritize "guns and butter" issues, the United States has large domestic budget deficits and has become the world's largest debtor nation; it has also expended a great deal of political capital to assure the deployment of controversial weapon systems it considers essential to deterrence and containment of the Soviet Union. To understand the current policy and strategy dilemma, a brief look at its evolution may be enlightening.

"Containment"

The conclusion of World War II confronted the United States with two major national security problems: how to deal with the emergence of the Soviet Union as a military power which threatened the United States ideologically and geostrategically, and how to accommodate the reality of nuclear weapons as a predominant factor in national security affairs. As Millett and Maslowski assert, the United States had no choice except to become constructively engaged on the international scene:

> The end of World War II marked the beginning of a new era for the United States, for its foreign policy could no longer stand on the twin pillars of noninvolvement and commercialism and its defense policy on the dual concepts of maritime security and wartime mobilization.... Had the United States followed its diplomacy of the marketplace and relied on broad oceans to protect it, the nation might have avoided the traumas of foreign wars, military alliances, and higher levels of peacetime military spending. The United States might also have lost its political and economic power and mortgaged the safety of its population.[5]

Ever since George Kennan introduced the term in 1947, "containment" has been the centerpiece of U.S. national security policy toward the Soviet Union.* The policy devolved from a grand strategy whose declaratory objective has been, as stated in the National Security Strategy of the United States:

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*Returning momentarily to our discussion of terminology: within a single paragraph in the syllabus for the National War College's course on Statecraft, "containment" is referred to as a "new approach," a "doctrine," a "balance of power policy," and a "grand strategy." "Strategy" is the most often used term, and probably the most commonly accepted, but "policy" appears to be the most logically correct.

> ...to prevent the Soviet Union from capitalizing on its geostrategic advantage to dominate its neighbors in Western Europe, Asia, and the Middle East, and thereby fundamentally alter the global balance of power to our disadvantage.[6]

Kennan's concept envisioned a policy which would guide strategies to:

-restore a global balance of power upset by the defeats of Japan and Germany and preclude expansion of Soviet influence in Eurasia;

-fragment the international communist movement, (which he did not perceive as monolithic);

-modify the Soviet concept of behavior in international relations.

The latter objective was formalized in 1948 in NSC 20/4, which declared that U.S. policy intended to:

> ...create conditions which will compel the Soviet Government to recognize the practical undesirability of acting on the basis of its present concepts and the necessity of behaving in accordance with precepts of international conduct, as set forth in the purposes and principles of the UN Charter.[7]

Discussion about how to achieve the desired conditions elicited two important issues, facets of which have been central to the national security policy debate ever since. One deals with the development of alternative strategies to support national security policy; the other involves the relationship between ends and means.

First, in oversimplified terms, the national security strategy alternatives available to support the policy of

containment have been "strongpoint defense" and "perimeter defense," or asymmetry and symmetry. The asymmetric approach involves the prioritization of interests as vital or peripheral based upon recognition that resources, being finite, mitigate against unlimited commitments. Kennan subscribed to this approach, believing that containment could be effective by keeping what he viewed as the major centers of industrial-military capability (the United States, Europe, China, and the islands of Japan, the Philippines and Okinawa) out of hostile hands. The symmetric approach, first posited in NSC 68 in 1950, contends that "the defeat of free institutions anywhere is a defeat everywhere"[8] and places emphasis on perimeter defense, with all points along the perimeter of the area to be contained considered of equal importance. This leads to increasing commitments and corresponding requirements for increasing resources in order to react to conditions at any point along the perimeter.

The second issue involving attempts to modify Soviet behavior in international affairs concerns the juxtaposition of ends and means and the attendant permutation of the rightful relationship between policy and strategy. With the advent of NSC 68, the United States adopted a symmetric strategy of encircling the Soviet Union with military alliances and forward deployed troops, attempting "to build what Dean Acheson liked to call 'situations of strength.'"[9] This replaced what had been a policy of containment based on economic and security

assistance and resulted in a preoccupation with military means that:

> ...left little room for efforts to alter the Soviet concept of international relations through positive as well as negative reinforcement. Rather, "strength" came to be viewed almost as an end in itself, not as a means to a larger end; the process of containment became more important than the objective that the process was supposed to obtain.[10]

Deterrence

The Korean War marked a major turning point in the development of United States national security policy. It provided the political context for rearmament and the development of NATO, as well as drawing the U.S. into an active military role throughout Asia. As a result, the United States committed itself to a series of bilateral and multilateral agreements in order to consolidate containment of Soviet and Chinese communists.

After the Korean War, as the sense of the Communist threat grew, the U.S. sought ways to make containment work without a major upturn in military spending. Nuclear weapons appeared to offer the potential for just that, and the concept of deterrence began to unfold. The nuclear dimension of military power achieved ascendancy. Communism obtained nasty monolithic characteristics when viewed as the Sino-Soviet bloc, but nuclear force was the ultimate trump card insuring the viability of containment. It also provided a potential for achieving "strength with solvency," a concept attributed to

Eisenhower which formed the basis for the "New Look." National defense policy and military strategy were designed to support the "New Look" through deterrence--the threat of indiscriminate and massive nuclear retaliation against the Soviet (or Chinese, for that matter) homeland as punishment for any Communist excursion beyond the containment perimeter.

The question of how to accommodate the reality of nuclear weapons was also a matter of the ascendancy of technology. Represented most outwardly by the theology of strategic air power and the advent of intercontinental ballistic missiles, nuclear issues dominated national security strategy to the extent that they supplanted even the other aspects of military strategy. The pursuit of the means required to make the nuclear threat credible became a virtual end in itself, spawning a number of inter-Service disputes in the process.

Unfortunately, reliance on nuclear force proscribed United States ability to react with discriminate force to contingencies such as the uprising in Hungary in 1956 (whether we wanted to or not), much less to small "brushfire wars" and insurgencies which were occurring with ever more frequency in the third world. In short, the asymmetric strategy of massive retaliation did not effectively support the policy of containment--a new approach was needed.

"Flexible Response"

Given intellectual legitimacy largely by Army General

Maxwell Taylor's The Uncertain Trumpet, the idea of "Flexible Response" emerged from the Pentagon during the Kennedy administration under the leadership of Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara. Flexible response:

> ...meant that the United States would meet Communist military threats with an appropriate level of matching force. Victory would be a return to geopolitical stability without an escalation to nuclear war.[11]

Although it is a national security strategy which has remained the cornerstone of United States national security policy for over a quarter of a century, with significant economic and political, as well as military, ramifications, flexible response has not always successfully supported national security policy either.

Vietnam was the first test of flexible response as a strategy of containment. It was, of course, an abject failure because United States policymakers failed to define the objectives of the war. Strategy and policy became almost reversed, leading to exhaustion of the Army in South Vietnam and eventual failure to achieve the containment objective of preventing expansion of Communist influence. As Kissinger noted:

> The American defeat there grew out of assumptions derived quite logically from that strategy [flexible response]: that the defense of Southeast Asia was crucial to the maintenance of world order; that force could be applied... with precision and discrimination....These assumptions in turn reflected a curiously myopic preoccupation with process--a disproportionate fascination with means at the expense of

> ends--with the result that a strategy designed to produce a precise correspondence between intentions and accomplishments in fact produced just the opposite.[12]

Even though the intent of flexible response has been to increase the number of options available to the national command authority, concepts for the employment of nuclear weapons have always been at the heart of the supporting military strategy. At the strategic level, the defense policy alternatives have been between counterforce and countervalue targeting, i.e. whether to use strategic nuclear forces to attack the Soviet nuclear forces directly or to attack the Soviet population and industrial infrastructure. At the theater level, the debate has been over the credibility of linkage.

For Western Europe, flexible response involves a three-tiered defense approved by NATO's defense planners in 1967 in memorandum 14/3: conventional forces are backed up with the threat to escalate to the use of tactical nuclear weapons to preclude conventional defeat; if necessary, the United States has committed itself to use its strategic nuclear arsenal against the Soviet Union to prevent it from achieving dominion over Western Europe through military means. From its inception, however, flexible response has met with mixed reviews because of the uncertainty over whether or not the United States would actually risk nuclear war for Western Europe. As Millett and Maslowski relate it:

> To defend Western Europe--and South Korea and Japan as well--the United States developed nuclear forces for forward deployment: intermediate range missiles stationed in NATO countries, Air Force fighter-bombers with the ability to drop nuclear weapons, and carrier-based aircraft. The option of regional nuclear war proved a mixed blessing. On the one hand, it demonstrated the indivisibility of the American nuclear umbrella and created nuclear alternatives short of general war. On the other hand, it tied American strategy to the behavior of its allies and opened the question of whether American guarantees had any meaning when the survival of the United States was at risk.[13]

The concept is certainly in question today. NATO's conventional posture traditionally has consisted of thin forward defenses with few operational reserves supported by powerful tactical air forces facing large Warsaw Pact in-place and follow-on echelons tailored for a rapid, mechanized advance across Western Europe. The Cold War has been characterized by the vision of these opposing forces staring starkly at each other across the inner German border, their use precluded by the specter of nuclear war, their existence the excuse for continued modernization.

Despite their overwhelming implications, nuclear weapons cannot be the end-all and be-all of American foreign policy. The nuclear rationale has been steadily eroded over the years by steady improvements in the size and quality of the nuclear arsenals of both the United States and the Soviet Union. The credibility of deterrence, at least at the theater level, is in serious jeopardy--both the will of the United States to use nuclear weapons, as well as the Soviet perception of that will,

are seriously in doubt. In the face of the Gorbachev initiatives, NATO continues to cling to a seemingly incredible strategy only because no alternative appears politically acceptable.

Arms Control

The real value of flexible response is that it has served as the basis for consensus within the NATO alliance. The conventional force situation in Western Europe has tacitly reflected the fact that a long conventional war is anathema to Europeans. Although reliance on theater nuclear weapons is even less attractive, it has provided an element of deterrence because it links European security to United States strategic nuclear weapons via the escalation ladder. Regardless of the logic, as long as the Communist threat was "real," consensus could be maintained. Now, consensus is at risk because of the ramifications of arms control agreements and proposals. The following key issues are central to today's policy debate:

- the elimination of intermediate range nuclear missiles (those with a range between 500 and 5500 kilometers), now agreed to in the INF Treaty, removes a key element of the linkage between United States strategic nuclear weapons and the defense of Europe. By removing a complete class of weapons, it lessens the credibility of deliberate escalation;

- Gorbachev's 7 December 1988 announcement at the United Nations that the Soviet Union would unilaterally reduce

its forces in Eastern Europe has served as a catalyst for forthcoming conventional arms reduction talks. It raises the possibility that perhaps large numbers of United States forces will be withdrawn from Europe, thus diminishing the most visible symbol of United States commitment to the defense of Western Europe;

- the "singularization" of the Federal Republic of Germany, particularly as a result of the elimination of SRINF missiles (the second zero--missiles with a range of 500-1000 kilometers) missiles. Even though the United States had no SRINF missiles to give up, the Soviets agreed to remove missiles which could hit France and the United Kingdom, but retained missiles capable of attacking Germany, causing the Germans to protest that they are asked to bear risks in greater proportion than are other NATO allies;

- SNF modernization, which includes updating nuclear bombs carried by tactical-fighter aircraft, modernized nuclear artillery projectiles, and the widely publicized follow-on to the Lance tactical ballistic missile, is being closely scrutinized. What is essentially merely an improvement program for a class of existing weapons has become an international political issue because some are enticed by the possibility of including SNF as a third zero in the European nuclear arithmetic. This might quiet the Germans concerned with "singularity," but could create a tremendous rift in the NATO alliance, since Britain and France vigorously oppose

negotiations on SNF.

What Gorbachev has done is to use the leverage of the only credible element of Soviet power, military force, in an attempt to decouple Western Europe from the United States. His success is predicated upon energizing powerful constituencies in both Europe and the United States which demand perpetual arms control negotiations as the price of political support. So far he is succeeding because the United States, and consequently the NATO Alliance, has failed to promulgate policy guidance under which dealings with the Soviet Union are to be conducted. Arms control, one element of national security strategy, is masquerading as an objective rather than as a means to an end. Preoccupation with this issue is detracting from our ability to deal with other significant factors of great importance to national security.

What Options Are Available?

Until recently, United States policymakers were confident that Soviet intent was to fundamentally alter the global balance of power. "Glasnost" and "perestroika" have introduced uncertainty into the black art of attributing intent to Soviet actions. Although it is by no means clear that Gorbachev has created irreversible change in the way the Soviet Union does business in either the foreign or domestic environments, it is quite evident that he has created an international situation which has placed the United States on

the defensive. What the United States does now should be predicated on the following considerations.

Whether change in the Soviet Union is "real" or not, it is certainly not altruistic. It does not represent a surrender of the Soviet system, and we should not expect to see a radical departure from its fundamental values. Realistically we must view what some describe as a Soviet turn inward as only temporary. Regardless of whether Gorbachev succeeds or not, the Soviets will continue for the forseeable future to face the complications of empire. Also, the most basic reality--that nations act in their own interest--cannot be ignored. Gorbachev's reforms are designed to enhance the Soviet Union's international leadership role in the long term. That enhancement, i.e. that increase in influence in other than just military affairs, must come at the expense of the West in general and the United States in particular. If Gorbachev's reform succeeds, the U.S. must cope with the inevitable shift in relative power in the non-military sphere.

Over the next decade, the world will become more clearly multipolar economically and politically; militarily it will remain essentially bipolar. United States interests in this world will be best served, as they are now, by maintaining a balance of power between autonomous, free and independent states coexisting in accordance with necessary fundamental rules governing international behavior.

The political challenge is to create conditions which

contribute to stability and promote cooperative efforts with the Soviets to achieve and maintain that stability in those areas where our interests converge. At the same time, we must preclude the development of unrealistic expectations; the key concept is that the United States and its allies are not going to be rewarding the Soviet Union for anything, but rather are adapting policy to a changed environment.

Part of that changed environment will include a Europe which differs from that to which we have become accustomed. Whether Moscow is accepted as a part of Europe or not, countries like France, Germany, Greece and Italy, in pursuit of their own national interests, can be expected to make bilateral economic and business agreements with the Soviets and their Warsaw Pact allies. West German nationalism may grow and there may be a strong impetus toward reunification of the two Germanies. The United States cannot prevent this from happening, but it can and should resist decoupling from Europe by projecting a vision of an Atlantic community founded on common ideological and economic interests. The prospects for the success of "perestroika" are probably greater in Eastern Europe than they are in the Soviet Union. The U.S. should insist on access to Eastern Europe as an indirect means of maintaining its ties to Western Europe as well as for developing and maintaining leverage for support of human rights and democracy.

In the near term, the Soviet Union will remain a

uni-dimensional power. If Gorbachev intends to continue his public relations offensive-- portraying the Soviet Union as a peace-seeking power--he has no choice but to make arms control the centerpiece of his public international agenda. The United States should continue to participate, but should insist that the Europeans lead the SNF and conventional force reduction public relations efforts. Allowing the Europeans to lead on these issues would contribute to European integration and the development of an enhanced sense of European identity. This may not be totally in U.S. interests but it is probably inevitable; having it occur within the NATO framework, however, favors the U.S. because it contributes to European integration within that framework, exclusive of major Soviet influence.

For now there is no politically or militarily acceptable alternative to the presence of United States conventional forces in Western Europe. However, a reduction of considerable magnitude is not necessarily to our disadvantage if the commitment of those forces can be redirected toward what Paul Kennedy calls:

> ...the sheer variety of military contingencies that a global superpower like the United States has to plan for--all of which, in their way, place differing demands upon the armed forces and the weaponry they are likely to employ.[14]

This would be a classic case of policy creating conditions which make some of the assumptions implicit in a strategy (flexible response in its broader sense) come true. It also illustrates the classic case of domestic constraints--the

public must be convinced that these forces should not be disbanded for budgetary reasons.

The real leverage for the United States is, of course, in the area of economics, but exploiting it will call for some diplomatic sophistication. Previous U.S. attempts to use economic tools for containment have been fiascos--witness the Carter grain embargo and the Reagan attempt to prevent construction of the trans-European natural gas pipeline.

"Perestroika" was born of economic necessity. To become a legitimate world power, the Soviet Union must solve serious domestic economic problems without completely unraveling its social contract. Western credits and investment can contribute to this effort, but there are pitfalls which will need to be avoided:

- to repay debt, the Soviets will need hard currency; until the ruble becomes convertible, this will require the Soviets to acquire hard currency through a trade surplus which will probably be achieved through the sale of arms. This would in essence put the West in a position of financing the modernization of the Soviet arms industry, which is not an attractive situation;

- money invested in the Soviet Union is not available as a resource elsewhere, where the payoff might be higher, and many would object to the concept of investing in socialism. However, the European Economic Community sees the Eastern bloc as a natural trading partner and will actively seek investment

opportunities in the Soviet Union. For the U.S. to object too loudly would be counterproductive as well as a failure to realize that money is fungible--despite U.S. restrictions on lending to the Soviets, U.S. money goes to the Soviet Union through Soviet loans drawn in Eurobank markets, where U.S. bank branches participate free of domestic restrictions.

The best U.S. approach would be to use its influence in the international financial institutions such as the General Agreement of Trade and Tariffs (GATT), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. The Soviet Union seeks to join all of these organizations, but existing membership restrictions and preconditions guarantee that there must be a "go slow" approach. It will be years before the Soviets can satisfy these conditions (for example, there can be stringent, although not preclusive GATT restrictions applied to non-market economies). This gives the West both leverage and breathing room--it can influence Soviet behavior by insisting that it meet conditions for membership in international organizations while waiting to see if "perestroika" does manifest itself in a less expansionist Soviet Union. It also preserves for the U.S. a significant policy voice: voting rights in the IMF and World Bank are weighted through a system recognizing relative economic importance, and changes in policy require substantial majorities (85% in the IMF) which give the U.S. virtual veto power.

Conclusion

Gorbachev's remarkable ability to control the international political agenda has exposed the United States as conceptually unprepared to deal with the Soviet Union, and to an extent, with its own allies, in other than military or politico-military terms. Since World War II, the U.S. has relied almost exclusively on military alliances, forward deployed armed forces and the threat of nuclear weapons to support its national security policy of containment. Consequently, it has failed to adequately integrate the potential of other elements of power, particularly economics, into national security strategy. On those occasions when it has sought to take other than a military approach, the U.S. has too often demonstrated remarkable diplomatic insensitivity--even naivete at times.

This preoccupation with the military dimension of power has not been the result of deliberate policy decisions. It has been the result of confusion about the proper relationship between policy and strategy and failure to insist on clear definition and prioritization of interests affecting the means-ends linkage. The pursuit of means to meet the ever-increasing threat, and honor commitments made in attempts to contain that threat, has been allowed to dominate strategy and shape the nature of the policy from which the strategy should derive guidance.

Development of a sensible, credible national security policy is certainly possible. The key is to make policy which

is broad-based enough to accommodate a modicum of change in the international environment over the long term. This involves recognition that the world is rapidly becoming multipolar in all but the military dimension. Economics is replacing militarism as the major theme in international political discourse. As long as the Soviet Union remains only a military power, however, military vigilance must remain a Western watchword. Now is not the time to forget about military power, but it is the time to put the policy-strategy relationship back into focus and ensure that objectives are based on interests which are derived from enduring national values. National security policy must insure that national security strategy incorporates all elements of national power into a cogent plan which will preserve U.S. and allied freedom and security.

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